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Abstract  
In this paper I challenge Murray Rothbard’s interpretation of the School of Salamanca as 
proto-Austrian.  I argue that Scholasticism is in goals and methods profoundly different from 
any modern school of economics, and that it is mistaken to use the Austrian school as a 
standard against which the Salamancans are to be appraised.  Further, Rothbard’s 
interpretation is vitiated by a misconception of the specificity of the Austrian School: while 
the Salamancans bequeath a lasting heritage for 21st century economists, it is a broad 
contribution, one for many schools, and not at all one specific to the Austrian standpoint.  
Finally, the natural law tradition, which Rothbard correctly identifies as a continuity 
between early modern, classical and Austrian thought, far from an anticipation of scientific 
thinking in the Salamancans, constitutes a residue of religious thinking amongst at least 
some Austrians.   
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1 Introduction 
Murray Rothbard argued in several publications, in particular his unfinished history of 
economic thought (2006a, b), and an earlier essay on the on the “prehistory” of the Austrian 
School (1976), that Austrian economics was a continuation of the Scholastic tradition, with 
the School of Salamanca at its heart.  The Classical School of Adam Smith and Ricardo, he 
thought, subsequently shunted the discipline onto a wrong track and it was left to the 
Austrians and other marginalists to restore Scholastic insights.  Rothbard’s view has stirred 
considerable interest and controversy.  See, for example, the Symposium (1998) on 
Rothbard’s stance on Adam Smith, in the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, and Jesús 
Huerta de Soto’s homage entitled “New light on the prehistory of the theory of banking and 
the School of Salamanca” (Huerta de Soto, 1996).  Despite the fact that Hayek, for one, 
clearly believed that he was operating within a Smithian paradigm (see the many approving 
references to Smith in Hayek, 1979, for example), many modern Austrians have agreed with 
Rothbard:  
I do not understand how anyone who has read Rothbard’s two volumes can continue 
to uphold the thesis that Adam Smith was a forerunner of the Austrian School.  
Furthermore, if Rothbard is right, there would be important arguments to defend 
the thesis that, at its roots, the Austrian school was a Spanish school.  (Huerta de 
Soto, 2009: 284 n 39) 
Matthews & Ortmann (2002) have persuasively argued that Rothbard’s characterisation of 
Adam Smith within the narrative he sets up is highly flawed.  The purpose of the present 
paper is to appraise Rothbard’s treatment of the late scholastics, and especially of the 
School of Salamanca, as “proto-Austrian”.  This thesis is particularly highlighted in Rothbard 
(1976) and Chapter 4, “The late Spanish scholastics”, of Rothbard (2006a).   
I find Rothbard’s interpretation to be flawed: on our reading, the School of Salamanca 
cannot be considered to be proto-Austrian.  Firstly, it is inappropriate to approach the 
Salamancans with any modern school in mind as a standard against which they are to be 
measured – and the attempt to do so, reading 16th century writers through 20th century 
spectacles, tells us more about the latter than the former.  Further, Rothbard’s 
interpretation is vitiated by a misconception of the specificity of the Austrian School; to the 
extent that the Salamancans leave a heritage for 21st century economists, it is a broad 
contribution, one for many schools, and not at all one specific to the Austrian standpoint.  
Finally, I find that his account of the tradition of natural law to be superficial and misleading.  
I agree that this core component of late Scholasticism is today important for many Austrian 
writers, but contrary to Rothbard’s judgement, far from an anticipation of scientific thinking 
in the Salamancans, natural law constitutes a residue of religious thinking in those 
Austrians.   
The next section examines a key aspect of the writings of the Salamancans, the question of 
usury.  The section argues that the Salamancan attitude to usury constitutes a gulf 
separating them from modern schools of thought, such as the Austrian school.  Section 3 
addresses the doctrine of just price, arguing that Rothbard misunderstands and 
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misrepresents Salamancan contributions.  Contrary to his interpretation, the Salamancan 
and Scholastic approach to just price constitutes a contribution to modern non-Austrian 
economics as much as, or more than, to Austrianism.  The topic of the final substantive 
section is Rothbard’s treatment of natural law.  I argue that Rothbard’s characterisation of 
natural law is completely false, and that once natural law is properly understood, it 
becomes apparent that, far from an anticipation of the scientific method amongst the 
Salamancans, the natural law framework constitutes a residue of religious thinking amongst 
those who adopt it today.  A final section concludes.   
 
2 Salamanca, Azpilcueta, and the “vexed question of usury” 
Rothbard’s aim, expressed in the title of his 1976 paper, New Light On The Prehistory Of The 
Austrian School, therefore, is to pursue and complete what he takes to be a complete 
revision of the pre-history of the Austrian school begun by Schumpeter in his posthumous 
1954 History of Economic Analysis:  
The most notable development in the historiography of the Austrian school in the 
post-World War II era has been the drastic reevaluation of what might be called its 
prehistory … The remarkably contrasting new view of the history of economic 
thought burst upon the scene in 1954 in the monumental, though unfinished, work 
of Joseph Schumpeter.  (1976: 36) 
The purpose of his paper, Rothbard says, is “to assess the contributions of writers who 
carried the Schumpeterian vision still further and who remain neglected by most 
economists … One of the most important, and probably the most neglected, was The School 
of Salamanca by Marjorie Grice-Hutchinson” (Rothbard, 1976: 36-37).  “The outstanding 
revisionist work on the economic thought of the medieval and later Scholastics is that of 
Raymond de Roover.” (Rothbard, 1976: 40)  “At about the same time as Schumpeter, Grice-
Hutchinson, and de Roover published their researches, Emil Kauder set forth a similar 
revisionist viewpoint” (Rothbard, 1976: 45).  What follows in Rothbard’s paper, however, 
does not assess the contribution of these writers; rather, Rothbard draws on what they say 
in order to develop a particular interpretation of the School of Salamanca as anticipating the 
Austrian School of economic thought.  Grice-Hutchinson’s book  
was a brilliant discovery of the pre-Austrian subjective-value-and-utility views of the 
late sixteenth-century Spanish Scholastics … it was the sixteenth-century Spanish 
Scholastics who developed the purely subjective and profree-market theory of value.  
(Rothbard, 1976: 37)  
The Spanish Scholastics also anticipated the Austrian school in applying value theory 
to money, thus beginning the integration of money into general value theory.  
(Rothbard, 1976: 38)  
Furthermore, the Spanish Scholastics went on to anticipate the classical-Mises-Cassel 
purchasing-power parity theory of exchange rates by proceeding logically to apply 
the supply-and-demand theory to foreign exchanges.  (Rothbard, 1976: 39)   
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The later work, the chapter on Salamanca in Rothbard’s Economic Thought Before Adam 
Smith (Rothbard, 2006a), then presumes this theme, and treats it as a standard against 
which he can measure the contributions of a sequence of Salamancan thinkers, applauding 
them for aspects of their work which support his interpretation, and censuring them for 
those that don’t.  Some, such as Azpilcueta, are awarded the laurels – “splendid”, 
“distinguished”, “clear”, “bold”, “outstanding contribution”, “most important 
contributions”, “Azpilcueta struck a blow for economic liberalism” (Rothbard, 2006a: 105-
107).  Others, such Soto, are reprimanded for their backsliding and conservatism: 
“Unfortunately, on economics de Soto was a reactionary thinker, and set back some of the 
liberal gains of the previous scholastics … de Soto, more than any other scholastic thinker, 
called for statism rather than market determination of price” (Rothbard, 2006a: 103).  This 
is not to say that the Salamancans are unambiguously divided into the good guys and the 
bad guys: each is given credit for their statements of doctrine which align with those of the 
Austrians and debit for those that don’t.     
I find Rothbard’s approach to be flawed: the Salamancans cannot be considered proto-
Austrian.  It is simply not appropriate to approach the Salamancans with any modern school 
in mind as a standard against which they are to be measured – and the attempt to do so, 
reading 16th century writers through 20th century spectacles, tells us more about the latter 
than the former.  I take Azpilcueta as an example.  Martín de Azpilcueta (1491-1586), Doctor 
Navarrus, or Navarro, taught canon and civil law for 14 years at Salamanca, and was one of 
the most eminent scholars of his time.  For Rothbard 
Azpilcueta … advance[d] economic liberalism farther than it had ever gone before, 
among the scholastics or anywhere else … Azpilcueta was the first economic thinker 
to state clearly and boldly that government price-fixing was imprudent and unwise. 
When goods are abundant … there is no need for maximum price control, and when 
goods are scarce, controls would do the community more harm than good … 
Azpilcueta’s outstanding contribution to economics was his theory of money, 
published in his Comentario resolutorio de usuras (1556) as an appendix to a manual 
on moral theology.  (Rothbard, 2006a: 105)  
The Comentario resolutorio de usuras was published in 1556 as the first appendix to his 
Manual de confesores y penitentes.  But Rothbard has made mistake here, as also did 
Marjorie Grice-Hutchinson (1952: 4, 89).  Azpilcueta’s theory of money is set out in the 
second appendix to the Manual, the Comentario resolutorio de cambios, not the Comentario 
resolutorio de usuras.  Typically the five appendices are bound together and the name of the 
first Comentario applied to all of them.  It is an easy slip to make.  An English translation of 
the Comentario resolutorio de cambios (Azpilcueta, 2004) has been published as 
Commentary on the Resolution of Money, translated by Jeannine Emery, although the same 
translation has also been published as On Exchange: An Adjudicative Commentary 
(Azpilcueta, 2014).  It is worth noting here that Comentario resolutorio just means analysis, 
so a better translation of the title would have been “On the analysis of exchange (or 
money)”, or just “On money”.  Fragments of the Comentario coming to seven pages have 
also been published in translation by Marjorie Grice-Hutchinson (1952: 89-96) – although, as 
noted above, she wrongly attributes the extracts to the Comentario on usury.   
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The fact that Azpilcueta’s main work on money was published as an annex to a handbook 
for confessors and penitents sets the context for Azpilcueta’s discussion.  In the Catholic 
faith one is required to confess one’s sins to a priest in order to be absolved, and hence to 
enter a state of grace, in which state one is fit to take holy communion.  The manual is a 
guide for the priest fulfilling this function and for the sinful parishioner seeking absolution.  
Spain at this time is at the centre of the world economy, with a vast empire and lucrative 
trading activities.  The question, for confessors and penitents alike, is: What is sinful, and 
what is not sinful, in the various activities comprising this enormous network of conquest 
and trade?   
The principal issues for confessors and penitents were usury, prices and money (Backhouse, 
2002: 60).  The goal for the Salamancans thus was partly to reconcile Aristotelian Thomism  - 
the philosophy of Aristotle, as interpreted by St Thomas Aquinas, OP, in the thirteenth 
century – with contemporary business practices, and partly to explain contemporary 
economic events, in particular the consequences of the importation of treasure from the 
Americas.  In the confrontation between doctrine and practice, it is inevitable that the line is 
drawn in different ways by different scholars.  But their goal is the same: to find a way to 
reconcile theology with trade.  The Scholastics, including the Salamancans, are casuists.  This 
is remote from modern economics, whether Austrian or not, and whatever the insights, 
indeed in some cases profound insights, that the Salamancans, with their background in 
Thomist Aristotelianism and their practical experience of the world of trade, are able to 
achieve.   
Azpilcueta begins his Commentary with an examination of a short passage of three lines 
from Gregory IX’s decretal “de usuris”.  The passage concerns whether it is to be thought 
usury if one lends to a merchant in specific circumstances regarding the allocation of risk 
between the borrower and the lender.  The first chapter of the Commentary is an exegesis 
of this passage, and the bulk of the remainder of the Commentary also deals with what is 
and what is not usury in various contexts.  We do not need to penetrate into the detail of 
this textual analysis because the overriding point for us is that it is taken for granted 
throughout that usury is wrong, and this is in fact the case for all the Salamancans without 
exception.  Discussing exchange (cambios), for example – a term often used to mean the 
exchange of one currency for another – Azpilcueta says that  
Whenever more than the principal is given or taken for reason of the time elapsed, 
or for waiting, or for advancing the payment, it becomes a veiled loan and contains a 
veiled usury … Just as the person who gives a mule today so that another that is 
worth much more is given to him in three, four, or six months, is a usurer, so also the 
person who gives some money today so that in three, four, or six months a larger 
sum is bestowed on him, is a usurer. (Azpilcueta, 2004: 223)  
This alone places the Salamancans in a completely different paradigm from the Austrians.  
Repeatedly, Rothbard censures them for their failing to get it right on “the vexed usury 
question” (Rothbard, 2006a: 101), as if it were a point that could be appraised in isolation, 
divorced from their overall Weltanschauung:    
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De Soto backslid on usury to such an extent that he advocated banning the foreign 
exchange market as usurious … de Soto exercised a reactionary influence on the 
usury ban.  (Rothbard, 2006a: 104).   
[I]f a future good is naturally less valuable than a present good on the market, then 
this insight should automatically justify ‘usury’ as the charging of interest not on 
‘time’ but on the exchange of present goods (money) for a future claim on that 
money (an IOU). And yet, this seemingly simple deduction (simple to us who come 
after) was not made by Azpilcueta Navarrus.  (Rothbard, 2006a: 107) 
On most other aspects of the usury question, however, Azpilcueta Navarrus was 
surprisingly conservative, and a big step backward … Azpilcueta Navarrus was 
conservative on most aspects of usury” (Rothbard, 2006a: 107-8). 
Other writers receive comments in a similar vein, since, although none of the Salamancans 
actually wanted to repeal the ban on usury, they varied in the degree of permissiveness 
they advocated:  
On usury, Molina, while still not going as far as the radical acceptance of interest by 
Conrad Summenhart a century earlier, took important steps in widening the 
accepted bounds of the charging of interest (Rothbard, 2006a: 114).   
With carentia pecuniae, therefore, Leonard Lessius delivered the final blow to smash 
the usury prohibition, while unfortunately still retaining the prohibition in a formal 
sense (Rothbard, 2006a: 126).   
On usury, de Lugo … draws back from the clear implications of Lessius and others 
that the usury ban should become a hollow shell (Rothbard, 2006a: 127).   
For Rothbard, this doctrinal proscription of usury was not only an irrational prejudice on the 
part of the Salamancans, and the Scholastics more generally, but a cause of the decline of 
Scholastic thinking:  
Sixteenth century Spain has well been called the Indian Summer of scholasticism. 
After that, its decline, not only in Spain but throughout Europe, was rapid. Part of 
the reason was a stubborn clinging to the form of the prohibition of usury. A ban 
which had made little sense, either by natural or divine law, and which entered 
Christian thought quite late in the day, was clung to and strengthened in an almost 
perpetual, irrational frenzy. (127) 
It is clear that with the growth of capitalism throughout Europe and the world, the Catholic 
Church found ever-greater difficulty in reconciling the proscription of usury with the 
necessities of finance.  The Doctors experimented with a number of loopholes such as  
• implicit intention – a loan is not sinful if the lender’s intention was not usurious; 
• census –an annuity contract or guaranteed investment contract, where a loan was 
seen as participating in an investment, but with a guarantee, or insurance, could be 
argued to be licit;   
• lucrum cessans – this is the doctrine that a lender may justly charge interest on a 
loan as compensation for profit foregone on other investments.   
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And it is also clear that the accumulation of these loopholes threatened to empty the ban of 
content, leaving only the formal shell of usury.  Nevertheless it is equally clear that the 
Doctors of Salamanca, perfectly conscious of this threat to a core belief, systematically 
withdrew from taking steps which would require its abandonment.  The sin of usury thus 
marks a doctrinal iron curtain between the Salamancan and Austrian standpoints, and 
between the scholastic and modern outlooks in general.  Rothbard’s rejection of this 
proscription as “irrational frenzy” is diagnostic.  It may be that the ban on usury was 
irrational and it may not.  Rothbard does not attempt to make the case.  For him, as an 
Austrian economist, individual freedom is beyond question.  Rothbard blames the 
Scholastics for “back-sliding” without any examination of the possible reasons for the 
proscription.  
But there is another way of looking at the matter, and it was incumbent on Rothbard to 
discuss it, even if he ended up disagreeing.  This alternative perspective was set out by 
Keynes in the General Theory.  For Keynes  
as a contribution to statecraft, which is concerned with the economic system as 
whole and with securing the optimum employment of the system’s entire resources, 
the methods of the early pioneers of economic thinking in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries may have attained to fragments of practical wisdom which 
the unrealistic abstractions of Ricardo first forgot and then obliterated. There was 
wisdom in their intense preoccupation with keeping down the rate of interest by 
means of usury laws (1973: 340)  
I was brought up to believe that the attitude of the Medieval Church to the rate of 
interest was inherently absurd, and that the subtle discussions aimed at 
distinguishing the return on money-loans from the return to active investment were 
merely Jesuitical attempts to find a practical escape from a foolish theory. But I now 
read these discussions as an honest intellectual effort to keep separate what the 
classical theory has inextricably confused together, namely, the rate of interest and 
the marginal efficiency of capital. For it now seems clear that the disquisitions of the 
schoolmen were directed towards the elucidation of a formula which should allow 
the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital to be high, whilst using rule and 
custom and the moral law to keep down the rate of interest.  (1973: 351-2)  
I take no view here of the correctness or otherwise of Keynes’s view, merely noting that it is 
evidence that there exists a possible rationale to the Scholastics’ attitude, and that it is 
incumbent on Rothbard to support his claim that the Doctors’ views were irrational by 
addressing such possible rationales.     
Rothbard writes  
De Roover … pointed to the great deficiency in Scholastic analysis of the market: the 
belief that any interest on a pure loan (a mutuum) constituted the sin of usury. The 
reason is that while the Scholastic[s] understood the economic functions of risk and 
opportunity cost, they never arrived at the concept of time preference. (1976: 142 n 
23)  
But a failure to conceive of time preference was not at all the reason for Scholastic 
opposition to usury.  Indeed, as Rothbard elsewhere argues, the Salamancans did raise the 
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issue of time preference: “One of Azpilcueta’s most important contributions was to revive 
the vital concept of time-preference” (2006a: 106).  The reason for Scholastic opposition to 
usury need not even be known to the Scholastics themselves.  Hayek says, speaking here 
specifically of the rules of conduct in primitive human societies – but the point is a much 
more general one – that “the ‘functions’ which these rules serve we shall be able to discover 
only after we have reconstructed the overall order which is produced by actions in 
accordance with them” (Hayek, 1967: 70).  We cannot assume that rules are functional – 
that would be Panglossian – or on the contrary that they are dysfunctional.  We have to 
understand, firstly, that they may be functional, by attempting mentally to reconstruct the 
order they form part of, and secondly that, if they are functional, the purpose which they 
serve is not necessarily understood by the participants themselves.   
 
3  The doctrine of just price 
Azpilcueta speculates at one point as to whether money is a necessary invention, and says 
that “I doubt whether it is really so today, for it destroys souls through avarice, bodies by 
war and great dangers upon the seas, and even whole fleets” (In Grice-Hutchinson, 1952: 
89).  While we need not take seriously his affected doubt as to the necessity of money, we 
certainly can take seriously his concern with the destruction of souls through avarice.  
Indeed, it is the destruction of souls through avarice which is at the root of the Scholastic 
opposition to usury and their wariness of trade.   
Much of Azpilcueta’s writing on money is implicitly about the concept of a just price, as is 
that of all the Salamancans.  We therefore need to explore the idea of a just price – that is, a 
price which avoids the destruction of souls through avarice.  Scholastic writers were 
concerned about what actions should be considered sinful and what should be considered 
licit for the purposes of confession and the absolution of sins.  Moreover they were 
concerned to make these distinctions in the context of participation in thin and scattered 
markets – what we would now call imperfect competition.  When a trader comes to 
confession, and describes his activity in the market, what should the confessor reply?   
Medieval writers on economic subjects seem to have been very much concerned 
with what we would describe as imperfect competition. Markets with many buyers 
and sellers certainly existed in the Middle Ages, but only at particular places and 
times. Transport costs were sufficiently high … to force many buyers and sellers to 
limit their transactions to those living near them.  (Friedman, 1987: 5378)  
In a society where many markets are thin … [t]he typical transaction is a bilateral 
monopoly and may have a considerable bargaining range … Medieval discussions of 
the just price, such as Aquinas’s, describe its applications to two-party transactions … 
the doctrine [of just price] can be understood as (among other things) a device to 
promote economic efficiency. It provided, in effect, an arbitrated solution to what 
would otherwise be costly bilateral monopoly bargaining.  (Friedman, 1987: 5377-8) 
Alongside the moral standpoint of the Church – a powerful one as it involves the sacrament 
of confession, with traders, officials and princes amongst the penitents – is the legal 
standpoint of the civil and canon law which this moral standpoint influenced.  “The normal 
rule of both canon and Roman law was, with some exceptions, freedom of contract; a 
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transaction was legitimate as long as both parties agreed to it” (Friedman, 1987: 5377).  
Where there was a market, and the potential for monopoly power less, Scholastics were 
content to accept the market price as the just price, and where regulation existed to 
counter monopoly power, then the regulated price could normally be assumed to be the 
just price:   
for many, including Aquinas, the just price of a good was normally its market price 
or, where price control existed, its legal price … for many, although not all, of the 
scholastics the just price was normally defined as the market price … the doctrine 
that individuals should buy and sell at the just price was a moral rule applied within a 
legal framework in which the usual rule was freedom of contract.  (Friedman, 1987: 
5377-8)  
It was when markets worked imperfectly, when there was market power, and the possibility 
of exploitation arose, that it became necessary to consider what price might be just in the 
circumstances.  Hence 
The schoolmen envisaged no conflict between the cost and market estimates of the 
just price. That conflict is of a much more recent date. The two estimates were used 
interchangeably and are perhaps best understood as complementary and mutually 
supportive criteria when the market did not function properly. When it did, cost had 
to adapt to the market anyhow. Does the fact that these estimates were thus 
associated mean that the medieval schoolmen anticipated modern value theory? 
Certainly not.  (Langholm, 2008: 2)  
Rather,  
A price obtained when the market did not function properly owing to monopoly or 
other market irregularities was held to be unjust because it involved economic 
coercion. Free consent to the price on the part of both the seller and the buyer was a 
fundamental requirement of justice in exchange. (Langholm, 2008: 2) 
Hence it was necessary to think about the formation of licit or just prices in circumstances 
both where the market price was and was not reliable.  Two aspects emerged, objective and 
subjective.  The objective aspects concerned the costs to the supplier.  It would be just of 
the supplier to set a price where he covered his costs.  Since most costs could be resolved 
into labour costs this tended to issue in something approaching a labour theory of value.  
The subjective side concerned the utility which the consumer experienced.  It would be illicit 
to use market power to extract payment beyond the buyer’s utility from consuming the 
good.  But then, since such buyers were presumably free to walk away, this leads us back to 
the market price as the just price.  Hence, in Aquinas, for example, “the just price of a good 
appears to be its market value or its value to the seller, whichever is higher” (Friedman, 
1987: 5377).   
This is exactly the context in which Azpilcueta is writing:  
the merchant’s trade is lawful so long as he undertakes it for a moderate profit in 
order to maintain himself and his family. After all, the art of exchange benefits the 
republic to some extent. I myself hold it to be lawful, provided it is conducted as it 
should be, in order to earn a moderate living. (Azpilcueta, in Grice-Hutchinson, 1952: 
90) 
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So a trade is without sin if it yields a moderate living, and sinful if it yields an immoderate 
one: maintenance but not luxury.   
The development of the objective and the subjective sides of value by the Salamancans is a 
contribution to modern economics.  Modern scholars from Marx to Marshall to Mises have 
benefited from the insights they developed.  But development does not occur in a straight 
line, and it often took the form of isolating one side or the other and developing it apart 
from the other.  That is, elements were taken out of context and exaggerated.  So Luís 
Saravia de la Calle writes:  
the just price arises from the abundance or scarcity of goods, merchants, and 
money, as has been said, and not from costs, labour, and risk. If we had to consider 
labour and risk in order to assess the just price, no merchant would ever suffer loss, 
nor would abundance or scarcity of goods and money enter into the question. Prices 
are not commonly fixed on the basis of costs. Why should a bale of linen brought 
overland from Brittany at great expense be worth more than one which is 
transported cheaply by sea?  (Saravia de la Calle, in Grice-Hutchinson, 1952: 82) 
Here Saravia separates the elements of costs, the objective side, and argues against 
considering “costs, labour and risk” when deciding what the just price should be.  But he 
doesn’t notice that he has already included them by speaking of “the abundance or scarcity 
of goods”.  The abundance or scarcity of goods is determined by costs incurred by the 
supplier in bringing them to market – including the labour costs, and the risks undertaken. It 
would indeed be double-counting to include them again in their own right.  Nevertheless, 
the Salamancans largely avoid the hypostatisation of the objective or subjective sides by 
taking either out of context of the other and exaggerating its importance.  It is worth 
considering the range of modern thought that combines the two sides in various ways.  The 
examples of Marx, Marshall and Mises all show how the subjective and objective sides of 
value have been understood without hypostatising either.   
Marx brings together the objective and subjective sides by asserting that the value of a 
commodity corresponds to the socially necessary labour time expended in their production.  
If twice as many hours of labour are expended on producing the commodity than would be 
required using the most efficient techniques, then the value embodied in the commodity 
only corresponds to half the hours expended.  That deals with the objective side, the costs 
incurred in producing something.  But, on the subjective side, the utility or use-value 
attained by consuming the article, what is socially necessary is what society, acting via its 
markets, has decided it wants.  If so many hours of labour are expended, using the most 
efficient techniques available, but the output is twice what is demanded, then only half that 
many socially necessary labour hours are embodied in the product (Marx, 1959: 187).   
Marshall regarded his theoretical apparatus, embodied in the partial-equilibrium supply and 
demand diagrams, as a reconciliation of classical and marginalist modes of thought.  The 
demand curve captured the subjective side in consumer preferences, and the supply curve 
the objective side in costs of production.  “We might as reasonably dispute whether it is the 
upper or the under blade of a pair of scissors that cuts a piece of paper, as whether value is 
governed by utility or costs of production” (Marshall, 1961: 348).   
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For Mises, “In an exchange economy, the objective exchange value of commodities 
becomes the unit of calculation … The subjective valuation of one individual is not directly 
comparable with the subjective valuation of others.  It only becomes so as an exchange 
value arising from the interplay of subjective valuations” (Mises, 1951: 115).  Later in the 
same work he refers to the necessity, for economic calculation, of “an objective 
recognizable unit of value which would enable economic calculations to be made” (Mises, 
1951: 135).  It seems that much subsequent Austrian thought, including that of Mises 
himself, has drifted away from this articulation of objective and subjective, towards a 
hypostatisation of the subjective.   
It is thus erroneous to argue that the steps forward taken by the Salamancans on the 
subjective determinants of value constitute a legacy for the Austrians alone, rather than for 
modern economics as a whole.  Only to a very limited extent were these steps accompanied 
by a hypostatisation of the subjective, a hypostatisation in which they were indeed followed 
by much Austrian thought four centuries later.   
Azpilcueta constitutes a particularly interesting case, given the high status he is accorded in 
Rothbard’s pantheon of the Salamancan Doctors.  Throughout the Comentario resolutorio 
de cambios, Azpilcueta’s goal is to distinguish between what is illicit and what is licit, what is 
and what is not sinful.  He therefore spends the bulk of his time considering activities which 
could border on or constitute usury.  What decides whether an activity is licit, is two (in 
some cases three) criteria.  The activity must exclude usury and it must command a just 
price (and sometimes it must be licensed by the state).  But what is to constitute a just 
price?  Clearly Azpilcueta cannot refer to the spontaneous market price, as that would 
include the remuneration of usury, but he is perfectly comfortable invoking a cost-of-
production view of what the just price must be.   
Chapter 6 of the Comentario is about “Exchange for small coin”.  Azpilcueta argues 
(Azpilcueta, 2004: 236) that it is licit for the state to set up an official whose job it is to 
convert between large- and small-denomination coins, for example, accepting a ducat in 
exchange for 375 maravedís.  According to Azpilcueta this is agreed by everyone, on account 
of its usefulness to the community.  But it is not agreed by all that it is licit, by extension, for 
a private individual, unlicensed by the state, to set up in business exchanging large and small 
coins.  Cajetan is given as an authority who denies this (Azpilcueta, 2004: 237).  However, 
Medina and Soto are said to disagree with Cajetan on this, because of the labour required in 
attending the premises, opening the safe, giving and receiving money, counting and re-
counting, and keeping the money safe.  It is these labours which must to be compensated.  
What this has to do with the legitimacy of conducting the business as a private 
entrepreneur is not explained, but it is clear that Azpilcueta, Soto and Medina think that the 
just wage for this business is that which will compensate the various labours exerted in its 
pursuit.  Hence in principle this kind of money changing is licit, but, Azpilcueta warns, “this 
exchange, which in itself is the most natural of all, may turn illicit if the exchanger takes 
more for himself than what [according to] just law or custom is owed to him” (Azpilcueta, 
2004: 239).   
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Further evidence that Azpilcueta’s theory of value does not dispense with the objective side, 
as Austrians would do, is contained in his continual invocation of equality in exchange.  This 
is a strong pointer towards the objective side: objective theories of value highlight the 
exchange of commodities of equal value.  For Smith, Ricardo and Marx, commodities were 
exchanged at their values in free markets – see the emphasis on equality in exchange in the 
first chapters of Marx’s Capital (1954: 43-144), for example, and for neoclassical writers, 
such as Walras (1954: 164), exchange of equal values is an equilibrium condition as in its 
absence there would be arbitrage opportunities.  Austrians, on the contrary, tend to 
emphasise inequality – from the subjective standpoint each party gains, since what is 
alienated is of less value to that individual than what is acquired.  According to Mises, “An 
inveterate fallacy asserted that things and services exchanged are of equal value. Value was 
considered as objective, as an intrinsic quality inherent in things and not merely as the 
expression of various people’s eagerness to acquire them” (Mises, 1949: 203).  Both 
objective and subjective perspectives are correct and valuable, but to isolate and 
hypostatise either side is erroneous.  As noted above, the Salamancans largely avoid this 
hypostatisation.  Azpilcueta is perfectly comfortable – unsurprisingly, drawing as he does on 
a very long-standing central tenet of scholastic doctrine – to invoke equality: “in order to 
make buying and selling just activities, it is necessary that what is bought is worth an equal 
price to what is being paid for it, and, conversely, that the price paid for it is equal to the 
goods’ worth … the inequality of bartered things makes illicit the exchange”.  (Azpilcueta, 
2004: 222).  Again, “According to Scoto’s [sc Duns Scotus’s] solemn rule: In every contract … 
there must be equality between what one party gives or does and what the other gives or 
does … All contracts that are unequal are unjust” (Azpilcueta, 2004: 244-5).  The evidence 
here is that Azpilcueta’s standpoint is more consistent with modern non-Austrian schools of 
thought than it is with Austrianism itself.   
 
4  The natural law tradition in Rothbard 
In his writings on the School of Salamanca, Rothbard draws attention to the tradition of 
natural law, interpreting this as something desirable, as something associated with reason 
and contrary to the absolutism of the time.  The School of Salamanca was an important 
transmission route for the natural law tradition and this tradition later flowered in the form 
of the Austrian School of economics.  While the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, he says, 
“saw the emergence of nominalism and at least the weakening of the idea of a rational, 
objective natural law – including a natural law ethics – discoverable by man’s reason[, t]he 
sixteenth century witnessed a renascent Thomism” (2006a: 100).  This renascent Thomism 
was able to re-establish natural law, laying the basis for later, more secular and libertarian, 
political and economic thought.  “In an age when thinkers in France and Italy were 
preaching secular absolutism and the power of the state, Vitoria and his followers revived 
the idea that natural law is morally superior to the mere might of the state.” (2006a: 102).   
The tradition was then taken over by Grotius, Pufendorf and Francis Hutcheson (1976: 44), 
and by the Enlightenment philosophes of the 18th century: the Physiocrats were “heavily 
influenced by the Scholastics … in their natural law theory” and “Scholastic doctrine even 
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appears in the … Encyclopédie, including the doctrine of natural law” (1976: 45).  The story 
Rothbard tells here is by and large correct, and he deserves credit for telling it, even though 
I cannot agree with his verdict that “by the time Hutcheson’s student Adam Smith (1723–
90) wrote The Wealth of Nations, pre-Austrian Scholastic influence had unfortunately 
dropped out altogether” (1976: 44).  On the contrary, Smith’s thought was entirely 
structured by natural law theory, as I have written on a previous occasion (Denis, 2005).   
We need to look at this question more closely.  The purpose of this section is to show that 
while it is correct that natural law was an important component of the world view both of 
the Salamancans and of at least some Austrians, this does not mean that Salamancan 
natural law anticipated modern scientific thinking about the economy, but rather that 
natural law today constitutes a residue of religious thinking.   
Rothbard makes frequent reference to natural law throughout his history of economic 
thought (2006a, b), starting with section 1 of chapter 1 of volume 1 (2006a: 3-6), “The 
Natural Law”, as understood by the ancient Greek philosophers.  This section sets out a 
definition of natural law according to which the correct way to study something is according 
to its nature.  Natural law is presented as a methodological principle for the positive study 
of phenomena, including human behaviour, with normative considerations set aside: “The 
concept of ‘good’ (and therefore of ‘bad’) is only relevant to living entities. Since stones or 
molecules have no goals or purposes, any idea of what might be ‘good’ for a molecule or 
stone would properly be considered bizarre.” (2006a: 4).  From here on, the notion of 
natural law remains the same throughout his study, with the writers considered awarded 
credit according to how faithfully they transmitted this doctrine to future generations.  Each 
generation is successful to the extent that it strips away mistaken notions and expresses the 
core ideas in an ever more clear and adequate form.  At the end stands the Austrian School, 
and all others are to be appraised in terms of their success or failure in preparing the way 
for Austrian thought.   
This whiggish approach to history – the past is interpreted as steps on the road to today’s 
knowledge – is itself a concomitant of the natural law tradition.  Natural law, contrary to 
Rothbard’s anachronistic interpretation, and whether of the Stoic or Catholic or Calvinistic 
variety, was a fundamentally religious doctrine in which positive and normative ideas were 
fused.  While religion, of course, places great weight on its divine texts, on the 
interpretation of revelation supposedly vouchsafed to its founders, natural law points out 
that the world, as created by the deity, must exhibit his works.  The study of the world, as 
well as of the sacred texts – not just the Book, but the Book of Nature, too – is thus a 
legitimate path towards knowledge of the deity.  When we study the world, because the 
universe is informed by a ubiquitous, omniscient, omnipotent, and beneficent deity, what 
we see is the working out via spontaneous processes of divine providence.  These 
spontaneous processes thus embody both positive and normative aspects.  To act in 
accordance with these processes is therefore good, and vice versa.  Dugald Stewart, 
eminent Smithian and Adam Smith’s biographer, puts it thus:   
A firm conviction that the general laws of the moral, as well as of the material world, 
are wisely and beneficently ordered for the welfare of our species, inspires the 
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pleasing and animating persuasion, that by studying these laws, and accommodating 
to them our political institutions, we may … [consider] ourselves … as fellow-workers 
with God in forwarding the gracious purposes of his government.  It represents to us 
the order of society as much more the result of Divine than of human wisdom.  
(Stewart, 2007: 248) 
Volney expresses the idea well:  
What is natural law?  It is the regular and constant order of facts by which God rules 
the universe; the order which his wisdom presents to the sense and reason of men, 
to serve them as an equal and common rule of conduct, and to guide them … 
towards perfection and happiness.  (cited in Becker, 1932: 45).   
The natural law approach thus has the limited attractive consequence that it is legitimate to 
study the world and not just divine texts.  But this is offset by the assumption that not just 
reason, but right reason (recta ratio) – reason profoundly educated in the Christian faith – 
must be employed to interpret what we may observe in the world.  And it has the less 
attractive and more important consequence that the world is construed as embodying 
divine reason and divine purpose, thus erecting an apology for the status quo.  If the world 
presents the appearance of imperfection, of sin and suffering, this is because we are only 
able to grasp it with the finite mind of man, rather than the infinite mind of God, who can 
see all the ultimate ramifications of things.  Pope expresses this very nicely in his poem An 
Essay on Man:  
All are but parts of one stupendous whole, 
Whose body Nature is, and God the soul … 
All discord, harmony not understood; 
All partial evil, universal good: 
And, in spite of pride, in erring reason’s spite, 
One truth is clear, Whatever is, is right.  (cited in Becker, 1932: 66) 
Adopting this standpoint immediately leads to a whiggish interpretation of history: the goal 
of history is what we see today, so the past is to be appraised as a process of approximation 
to today’s conditions.   
Angner (2007) has ably argued that Hayek is a proponent of a twentieth century version of 
natural law.  It is interesting to note here the very favourable view that Hayek takes of the 
natural law tradition.  Hayek (1967a: 131ff) details how the idea of spontaneous order was 
maintained by theorists of ‘the law of nature’ – ie, natural law – from Greek times up to the 
present.  He postulates a connection between freedom, natural law, and a belief in the 
agency of a benign deity: “There appears to have existed in all free countries a belief that a 
special providence watched over their affairs which turned their unsystematic efforts to 
their benefit” (Hayek, 1967a: 130).  Adam Smith himself partook fully of that belief, as Roll 
shows:  
The social philosophy which underlies it [The Wealth of Nations] was widely held at 
the time, and Smith’s teacher, Francis Hutcheson, was one of its chief exponents.  It 
was from him that Adam Smith derived his faith in the natural order.  The naturalist 
school of philosophy to which he belonged had had an unbroken tradition from the 
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later Greek Stoics and Epicureans onwards … and came to full flower in the writings 
of Smith, the physiocrats, and the later radicals … these schools can be regarded as 
representative of a single trend of thought.  Its essence is a reliance on what is 
natural as against what is contrived.  (Roll, 1938: 143-4).   
As indicated above, the reliance on what is natural against the products of human reason 
derives from a belief in the beneficence of the deity whose body nature is, and leads to an 
apologetic standpoint in which “partial ills” are interpreted as “universal goods”.  It is 
certainly true that the Salamancans endorsed, developed and transmitted natural law ideas, 
and it is also arguable, as Rothbard claims, that the Austrian school embodies those ideas, 
perhaps in the most pure and extreme form of any school of thought today.  But far from 
exemplifying a proto-scientific standpoint on the part of the Salamancans, this rather 
underlines a hangover of religious ideas within Austrian thought.   
A major source for the study of Salamancan natural law thought is Fernández-Santamaría’s 
2005 study entitled Natural Law, Constitutionalism, Reason of State, and War, forming 
Volume I of his Counter-Reformation Spanish Political Thought.  Fernández-Santamaría 
begins his account by referring to the words of an anonymous referee, that sixteenth-
century Spanish thinkers “sought to arrive at a coherent justification, consistent with 
Christian teaching, of the patterns of action of the emerging modern state.”  In Fernández-
Santamaría’s view, “As an explanation of what Spanish intellectuals … strove to accomplish 
during the second half of the sixteenth century, this short statement can hardly be 
improved upon” (Fernández-Santamaría, 2005: 1).  The very first sentences of Fernández-
Santamaría’s book thus go to the heart of the matter: the attempt to understand the 
Spanish imperial state by interpreting it in the light of Christian doctrine.  That inevitably 
means recourse to natural law conceptions:  
the tradition of Dominican and Jesuit Thomism that since the days of Francisco de 
Vitoria sought to find answers to the questions raised by the rise of the modern 
state, the discovery of America, and the Reformation … is a tradition that culminates 
in the thought of Francisco Suárez.  For these Spanish Neoscholastics natural law is 
the key to everything.  The political universe of orthodox Catholicism as the Spanish 
theologians and jurists see it lies firmly set on a foundation of natural law itself 
understood in Stoic and Aristotelian-Thomist terms.  (Fernández-Santamaría, 2005: 
4)   
Writing of the Stoics, Fernández-Santamaría identifies the heart of natural law as a morality 
rooted in an understanding of the divine purpose of the world:  
the reason (right reason) exercised by man is essentially the same quality as the 
reason governing the cosmos … Endowed with reason, then, man becomes 
acquainted with the rational principles that rule the universe, the laws of nature, and 
consciously complies with them.  By virtue of his rationality, therefore, man 
recognizes himself as part of the universe and thereby pledges to work for the whole 
it represents … Stoic happiness (eudemonia) or virtue … is… life lived in accordance 
with nature… to live in accordance with nature means … the concordance of human 
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actions with the law of nature, the concordance of the human will with the Divine 
Will.  (Fernández-Santamaría, 2005: 18-9)   
For the Salamancans, following Thomas Aquinas, there are four notions or levels of law.  The 
top level is eternal law, which we mortals may participate in via its two species, “natural law 
engraved by God in the minds of men as the norm corresponding to their collective nature, 
that is, the principles that man knows through his natural reason alone”, and “divine law, 
both Old and New” (ie the Old and New Testaments of the Christian Bible) (Fernández-
Santamaría, 2005: 93-4).  Finally, at the lowest level, are the laws which “God authorized 
men to establish”, “the laws that he judged necessary in accordance with time, place and 
circumstances” (Soto cited by Fernández-Santamaría, 2005: 94); “those human laws must, 
at all times, be in conformity with natural law”.   
Ultimately, then, all the Salamancans find that the state power of the emerging Spanish 
empire – its potestas, potestas civile, publica potestas, regia potestas, suprema potestas, 
auctoritas, dominium, or imperium – is of divine origin, though the manner in which it is 
wielded and the organisational forms adopted are human.  For Vitoria, “[a]ll potestas, 
regardless of whether it is public or private, is not only just and legitimate but, inasmuch as 
it has God as its author, cannot be abrogated even with the consent of the whole world” 
(41).  Vitoria argues that the efficient cause of potestas is God, “for, after all, inasmuch as 
the publica potestas has been mandated by natural law whose author, in turn, is God alone, 
it necessarily follows that the public power is of God alone” (42).  According to Vitoria, 
“[r]egia potestas is not only just and legitimate but kings have it by divine and natural law” 
(Vitoria, cited by Fernández-Santamaría, 2005: 44).  For Vitoria “kings derive their authority 
from God”  (Fernández-Santamaría, 2005: 166).  For Soto “potestas civile … was ordained by 
God by means of natural law” (Soto, cited in Fernández-Santamaría, 2005: 166).  Soto 
regards dominium as “a right clearly deduced from the principles of nature” (Fernández-
Santamaría, 2005: 166).  According to Suárez, “That power [potestas] is given immediately 
by God in his role as the author of nature … God is both the principal and exclusive author of 
that power” (Suárez, cited by Fernández-Santamaría, 2005: 192).  Suárez believed that 
“Political power is something in nature and as such it is, simpliciter, good and necessary for 
man and his relations with his fellows; obviously, given these circumstances only the Creator 
of man could possibly be the source of that power” (Fernández-Santamaría, 2005: 193).  For 
Suárez,  
the political prince gets his power from God Himself … all things that are of the law 
of nature are from God as the Author of nature; but political principality is of the law 
of nature; therefore it is from God as the Author of nature. … since this principality is 
just and lawful, it cannot fail to be consonant with the natural law; and since it is 
necessary for the conservation of human society, which human nature itself seeks, it 
is also by this title from the natural law, which demands such power; therefore as 
God, who is the Author of nature, is also the Author of the natural law, so also he is 
the Author of this primacy and power. (Suárez, 2012: 281) 
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This is a conception of natural law utterly at odds with Rothbard’s simplistic presentation, 
according to which natural law is the positive study of the nature of a thing with normative 
views set aside.   
 
5 Conclusion  
I find Rothbard’s interpretation to be flawed: on our reading, the School of Salamanca 
cannot be considered to be proto-Austrian.  Firstly, it is inappropriate to approach the 
Salamancans with any modern school in mind as a standard against which they are to be 
measured – and the attempt to do so, reading 16th century writers through 20th century 
spectacles, tells us more about the latter than the former.  Further, Rothbard’s 
interpretation is vitiated by a misconception of the specificity of the Austrian School; to the 
extent that the Salamancans leave a heritage for 21st century economists, it is a broad 
contribution, one for many schools, and not at all one specific to the Austrian standpoint.  
Finally, I find that his account of the one element of late Scholasticism which can be claimed 
as feeding into Austrianism, the tradition of natural law, is quite unpersuasive: contrary to 
Rothbard’s judgement, natural law, far from an anticipation of scientific thinking in the 
Salamancans, constitutes a residue of religious thinking in those later economists working in 
a natural law framework.   
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